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The Appellant, County Board of Equalization of Salt Lake County ("Board"), by
its attorney of record, respectfully submits its brief pursuant to Rule 24 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure. This appeal arises from the Utah State Tax Commission's ("Tax
Commission") Order dated June 26, 2003 and the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Final Decision dated June 26, 2003.
JURISDICTION
The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j).
ISSUES PRESENTED
ISSUE NO. 1: Did the Tax Commission err in accepting a lay opinion as to "fair
market value" for contaminated residential property? Utah Department of
Transportation v. Jones, 69A P.2d 1031 (Utah 1984); Utah Code Ann. § 59-2102(12)(2004).
This issue was preserved for appellate review before the Tax Commission. R. at
86, 92-94, 98-99.
Standard of Review: The Tax Commission's decision was a legal conclusion and
is therefore reviewed under a correctness standard. Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610 (2003);
Drake v. Indus. Comm'n of Utah, 923 P.2d 177,181 (Utah 1997).
ISSUE NO. 2: Did the Tax Commission err in determining that the Baggetts' land
value was zero based upon substantial evidence contained in the record as a whole?
This issue was preserved for appellate review before the Tax Commission. R. at
86,92-94,100-102.
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Standard of Review: The Commission's decision should be reviewed under the
substantial evidence standard applicable to factual findings. Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610
(2003); Kennecott Corp v. Utah State Tax Comm'n., 858 P.2d 1381,1385 (Utah 1993).
ISSUE NO. 3: Did the Tax Commission err in determining that the Baggetts
sustained their burden of proof based upon sound evidence submitted at the formal
hearing on June 2, 2003?
This issue was preserved for appellate review before the Tax Commission. R. at
100-102.
Standard of Review: The Commission's decision should be reviewed under the
substantial evidence standard applicable to factual findings. Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610
(2003); Nelson v. Bd. of Equalization of Salt Lake County, 943 P.2d 1354 (Utah 1997);
Kennecott Corp., 858 P.2d at 1385.
ISSUE NO. 4: Did the Tax Commission err in determining that the "fair market
value" for the Baggetts' property is $244,900 for the 2002 tax year (which includes a land
value of zero), based upon construction cost estimates to remediate the contaminated land
being in excess of the assessed value, when all costs will be borne by third parties?
Article XIII, Section 2 of the Utah Constitution, Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(12)(2004).
This issue was preserved for appellate review before the Tax Commission. R. at
49-50,146-148,150,217.
Standard of Review: The Commission's decision should be reviewed under the
substantial evidence standard applicable to factual findings. Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610
(2003); Kennecott Corp., 858 P.2d at 1385.
2

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION AND STATUTES
Utah Const. Art. XIII, § 2(l)-(2).
(1) So that each person and corporation pays a tax in proportion to the fair market
value of his, her, or its tangible property, all tangible property in the State that is
not exempt under the laws of the United States or under this Constitution shall be:
(a)

assessed at a uniform and equal rate in proportion to its fair market
value, to be ascertained as provided by law; and

(b)

taxed at a uniform and equal rate.

(2) Each corporation and person in the State or doing business in the State is
subject to taxation on the tangible property owned or used by the corporation or
person within the boundaries of the State or local authority levying the tax.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(12)(2004).
(12) "Fair market value" means the amount at which property would change hands
between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy
or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-301 (2003).
The county assessor shall assess all property located within the county which is
not required by law to be assessed by the commission.
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Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-103(1) (2003).
All tangible taxable property shall be assessed and taxed at a uniform and equal
rate on the basis of its fair market value, as valued on January 1, unless otherwise
provided by law.
Utah Code Ann. § 59^1-610(l)(a) and (b).
(1) When reviewing formal adjudicative proceedings commenced before the
commission, the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court shall:
(a) grant the commission deference concerning its written findings of fact,
applying a substantial evidence standard on review; and
(b) grant the commission no deference concerning its conclusions of law,
applying a correction of error standard, unless there is an explicit grant of
discretion contained in a statute at issue before the appellate court.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A,

Nature of Case and Course of Proceedings

The Salt Lake County Assessor's office ("Assessor") valued Daniel and Vicky
Baggett's ("Baggetts") real property at $364,900 for the 2002 tax year. R. at 439. The
Baggetts appealed this value assessment to the Board. The Board held a hearing on
December 3, 2002. R, at 445. The Board issued its Notice of Final Decision on Appeal
on December 19, 2002, adjusting the value of the Baggetts' property to $288,500. R. at
439 The Baggetts filed a Request for Redetermination of the County Board of
Equalization Decision with Board's clerk on January 24, 2003. R. at 438. The Request
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for Redetermination of the County Board of Equalization Decision was received by the
Utah State Tax Commission's appeals unit on February 21, 2003. R. at 438.
A Mediation Conference was scheduled for April 28, 2003 before the Utah
State Tax Commission. R. at 434. On April 8, 2003 the Baggetts sent a formal request to
"opt out" of the Mediation Conference and requested that the appeal be set for a Formal
Hearing. R. at 433. On April 16, 2003 the Utah State Tax Commission issued a Notice
of Changed Hearing and set a Formal Hearing in the Baggett appeal for June 2, 2003. R.
at 418. A Formal Hearing was held on June 2, 2003. On June 26, 2003 the Commission
issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Decision ("Final Decision"), in
which it valued the Baggetts5 land for tax year 2002 at a market value of $0 (zero), and
an improvement value for the home at $244,900. R. at 178-187. On July 22, 2003 the
County filed its Petition for Judicial Review with the Utah Supreme Court. R. at 189.
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4), on October 7, 2003, this matter was transferred
to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition.
On November 10, 2003, the Board filed a motion for voluntary dismissal pursuant
to Rule 37(b) Utah R. App. P. The Court dismissed this matter on November 14, 2003.l

1

Prior to the Board filing its voluntary Motion to Dismiss Appeal on November 10, 2003,
the Board inquired of Baggetts' counsel whether the Baggetts would be willing to
stipulate to such dismissal, pursuant to the first prong of Rule 37(b), Utah R. App. P. In
response, the Baggetts coupled any stipulation with conditions to which the Board could
not stipulate. On November 10, 2003, pursuant to the second prong of Rule 37(b), Utah
R. App. P., the Board filed its voluntary Motion to Dismiss Appeal, requesting that the
Court dismiss the Board's previously filed Petition for Judicial Review, putting any
award of costs and fees before the Court to fairly decide. The Board maintains at all
times it has been willing to pay the amount of costs and fees incurred up to the dismissal
request by the Board. This offer is consistent with Rule 37(b) Utah R. App. P. and is all
5

On the same day, November 14, 2003, the Baggetts filed a motion for summary
disposition and memorandum in opposition to the Board's motion to dismiss. The Board
then wrote a letter to the Court and Baggetts' counsel indicating its willingness to have
the appeal reinstated because the Baggetts were not allowed 10 days to respond to the
motion initially. At the same time the Board requested that it be given time to respond to
the accusations raised in the Baggetts' filings on November 14, 2003. The Board then
filed its motion and supporting memorandum in opposition to summary disposition,
motion and supporting memorandum to strike the Baggetts' motion for summary
disposition as late filed. On May 25, 2004, the court denied the Board's motion to
dismiss and denied the Baggetts' motion for summary disposition indicating that the
parties will be notified of a briefing schedule. On June 3, the court notified all parties of
the briefing schedule.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Baggetts own residential real property parcel no. 28-12-151-008, commonly
known as 9682 South Quail Ridge Road, Sandy, Utah 84092. R. at 76. The Baggetts
purchased the subject property in 1996 with conventional financing for the sales price of
$390,000. R. at 90-91, 235. The subject property is .65 acres, with 2,858 above grade
square footage and 2,210 below grade square footage of which 1,989 is finished. R. at
238. The subject property is located within the Flagstaff and Davenport Smelter
Superflind Site Location. R. at 217. In 1991 there was a discovery of ladle casts in Little
Cottonwood Creek, which is near the Flagstaff Smelter location. R. at 217. This
that is required of an appellant.
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discovery in 1991 prompted a historical review and investigation into smelter operations
in and around the Little Cottonwood Canyon area. R. at 217. It was discovered that the
Flagstaff and Davenport Smelters were constructed around 1870 at the mouth of Little
Cottonwood Canyon. R. at 217. Both smelters processed lead and silver that was
removed from mines located near Alta, Utah. R. at 217. The smelters operated for a
period of roughly four (4) years in the 1870's. R. at 19, 20.
Once the ladle casts were discovered in 1991, the United States Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") performed "investigations" in 1992 as well as the Utah
Department of Environmental Quality ("UDEQ") in 1994 taking samples from the
surrounding Smelter areas. R. at 217-227. At that time, elevated levels of arsenic and
lead were detected in the soil in and around both smelter locations, including in the
subject property's designated neighborhood. R. at 217, 228-229, 247. In 1992, the
Flagstaff-Davenport Smelter Sites were placed on the CERCLA Information System
("CERLIS") list. R. at 234. The CERCLIS list shows "actual completion" of the
discovery of contamination in April 1992; a preliminary assessment occurred in 1992 and
was completed in October 1992, and a site inspection commenced in May 1994 and was
completed in April 1996. R. at 234. The subject property and the Davenport Smelter
Site are both located in the same neighborhood. R. at 217, 228-229, 247.
In 1998 and 2001 extensive sampling took place at the Flagstaff and Davenport
sites. R. at 217. In January of 2000, the Flagstaff and Davenport Smelter Site locations
were proposed for the Superfund National Priorities List ("NPL"). R. at 217. On or
about December 2000, the UDEQ sent a letter to affected real property owners indicating
7

that the Flagstaff and Davenport Superfund Site would be placed on the NPL. R. at 25,
252. Because no responsible parties could be found to pay to clean up the
contamination, the EPA and the UDEQ will incur all of the costs associated with the
clean up, including site remediation and any response action. R. at 217.
In 2001 the UDEQ and the EPA commissioned a Remedial
Investigation/Feasibility Study that identified the contaminants present in the area and the
range/depth of the contamination. R. at 219. In May 2002, the UDEQ and the EPA
issued its Davenport and Flagstaff Smelters Superfund Site Proposed Plan. R. at 217.
This provided for a public comment period between June 10, 2002 and July 10, 2002. R.
at 216. The EPA established that the action levels for the Davenport and Flagstaff
Smelters Site would be 600 milligrams/kilograms for lead and 126 milligrams/kilograms
for arsenic. R. at 219.
There were three alternatives listed in the "Proposed Plan" for remediation. R. at
215-227. Originally, the EPA and UDEQ had selected Alternative 3, but that was later
changed to Alternative 2. R. at 34-36, 277. After public hearing and input, the UDEQ
and the EPA selected Alternative 2 (with modifications) of the proposed plan.2 R. at 3435, 277. Under this alternative, all non-native vegetation such as lawn and trees in areas
requiring remediation will be removed and replanted and then filled with clean soil. R. at
277, 278, Ex. P-4. Once clean up has occurred, no institutional controls will be placed on
the property that has been remediated. R. 272, 278, 279. "Institutional controls will be

2 The Record of Decision was completed on September 30, 2002. R. at 234. Notice of
the signed Record of Decision was circulated to the public in February 2003. R. at 277.
8

implemented to address any residual risk associated with contaminated soil left in place
below the depth of excavation at the properties . . .." R. at 272 (emphasis added). Mr.
Tom Daniels, Environmental Engineer, UDEQ, and Project Manager for the FlagstaffDavenport Superfund Site testified that no institutional controls will be imposed on those
properties which are cleaned up. R. at 51. Mr. Richard Burgi, an appraiser with the
Assessor's office, testified that no institutional controls were put in place at either
Herriman or the Midvale Superfund Site (Sharon Steel) on the residential properties that
had been cleaned up. R. at 146-147. The UDEQ and EPA's experience leads them to
believe that any impact on real estate values will be short-term and they expect value to
improve as a result of the clean up. R. at 233 (backside).
The subject property was tested in 1998, prior to the UDEQ and EPA's selection
of the "Proposed Plan." R. at 45, 283, 330. The sampling showed that the subject
property maintained samples above the action levels for lead. R. at 46, 283, 330. The
sampling also indicated that the subject property did not have any samples that were
above the action levels for arsenic. R. at 46, 283, 330.
Mr. Daniels testified that the Baggetts' property evidenced lead levels above the
600 ppm (parts per million) action level based on sampling done at the Baggetts' property
in 1998. R. at 43-49. The test results show that four out of the six surface samples are
below the action level for lead and all of the samples for arsenic are below the action
levels. Of the 19 subsurface samples, 13 samples are below the action level for lead. R.
at 43-49, 210-213. All of the samples in the Baggetts' front yard are below the action
level and would not need to be cleaned up. R. at 47. Only the areas that exceed the
9

action level determined by the EPA and UDEQ will be cleaned up. R. at 47. No
remediation would be required below 12 inches since test results showed no
contamination at that level. R. at 210-212.
The primary source of exposure to lead is through ingestion of soils and
institutional controls such as education can eliminate such exposure. R. at 50. There are
no restrictions by either the UDEQ or the EPA preventing the Baggetts from selling their
property. R. at 52. Additionally, clean up by the UDEQ and the EPA will occur even in
the event of a sale of the property. R. at 52.
For the 2002 assessment year, the Assessor's office valued the subject property at
$364,900. R. at 439. The Baggetts appealed this assessment to the Board. The Board
adjusted the value of the Baggetts5 property to $288,500. R. at 439. The Baggetts
appealed the Board's decision to the Tax Commission. Ms. Kathy Taufer of the
Assessor's office performed an appraisal for the Baggetts' real property. The opinion of
fair market value represented in the appraisal was $364,800. R. 236-244. Ms. Taufer
researched the Flagstaff-Davenport Superfund Site area and found three (3) comparable
sales to use in performing the appraisal. R. at 236-244. All three comparables were
located in the same Salt Lake County designated "Neighborhood 923." R. at 118. The
largest adjustment in the Board's appraisal was a stigma deduction applied at $60,000 per
acre (to the subject and comparables) to address contamination. R. at 106, 236-244. Ms.
Taufer had previously performed appraisals in the city of Herriman where contamination
similar to the Flagstaff-Davenport area was found and the cost to remediate the
residential properties in Herriman was $60,000 per acre; therefore, a $60,000 remediation
10

cost used in Herriman by the EPA and UDEQ, was used as a stigma deduction to the
residential properties located in the Flagstaff-Davenport Superfund area. R. at 106-107,
236-244. Market sales of residential properties in Herriman remained consistent before
and after contamination was discovered. R. at 108-110. Additionally, sales remained
consistent before and after the contamination was remediated by the UDEQ, with
oversight by the EPA. R. at 108-110. The Assessor's office indicated that a residential
property that was deemed clean of contamination with zero institutional controls placed
on the property would sell in the real estate market as if the property did not contain any
contamination. R. at 110. There does not appear to be any stigma in the residential real
estate market of a previously contaminated area once a residential property has been
remediated. R. at 109-111. Typically no institutional controls are placed on residential
property. R. at 109.
Residential properties in the Baggetts' neighborhood (Neighborhood 923) have
sold consistently after contamination was discovered, sampled and made public in 1992.
R. at 107. The Baggetts purchased their property in 1996, four years after contamination
was discovered and made public in the Flagstaff-Davenport area, for $390,000, with
conventional financing. R. at 90-91,110.
The Baggetts' property is currently being used as a single-family residence by the
Baggetts, who have complete and full use of their surrounding yard. R. at 125. The
Baggetts' yard is landscaped with native and non-native vegetation with two outside
decks connected to the home. R. at 111-112. The home is well maintained both inside
and outside, and the surrounding areas of landscaping are also well maintained. R. 106,
11

111. Ms. Taufer testified that the "highest and best use" of the subject property is a
single-family residence which is consistent with its current use. R. 106.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Tax Commission erred in allowing Mr. Baggett to testify as to the fair market
value of his contaminated residential real property. Mr. Baggett was not duly certified as
an expert to testify as to the value of his real property with contamination. Whether Mr.
Baggett was qualified to render his opinion of the construction cost estimates he
formulated is immaterial as to his testimony regarding the fair market value of his
contaminated property. The Tax Commission erroneously accepted Mr. Baggett's
construction cost estimates and subsequent deductions from the value determined by
Kathy Taufer as an opinion of fair market value of his contaminated residential real
property. Based upon the error in allowing Mr. Baggett to furnish an opinion of fair
market value tainted the whole proceedings before the Tax Commission. This fatal error
lead to the Tax Commission's erroneous findings of fact.
The Tax Commission erred because its findings were not based upon substantial
evidence contained in the record as a whole. Mr. Baggett's production of construction
cost estimates was not an opinion of fair market value for his real property with
contamination. The Baggetts did not provide any appraisal evidence at the hearing before
the Tax Commission. The Board performed an appraisal by a licensed appraiser applying
a stigma deduction for contamination. The stigma deduction was determined from
research of other superfimd areas that required clean up by the EPA and UDEQ. The

12

Baggetts offered no evidence to dispute the application of the $60,000 per acre deduction
for stigma.
The Tax Commission made a finding that one comparable in the Board's appraisal
was "clean," when the evidence supports a finding that this property contained
contamination as sampled by the EPA and UDEQ (but did not rise to the determined
remediation levels). All three comparable properties of the Board's appraisal were
located within close proximity of the Baggetts' property (one comparable being on the
same street) and adjusted for contamination.
The Baggetts purchased their property a full four years after contamination was
discovered in the Superfund Site and was made public. Public meetings were held in the
early 1990's, putting all potential buyers on constructive notice of the contamination.
The Baggetts purchased their property in late 1996 for $390,000 with conventional
financing. The appraisal used by the Baggetts at the time of their purchase did not value
their land value at zero.
The Tax Commission erred in determining that the Baggetts carried their burden
of proof at the hearing. The taxpayer has the burden of proving that they are entitled to a
reduction in taxable value based upon the fact that there is contamination on their
property. The Baggetts offered no appraisal evidence to support their claim that they are
entitled to a reduction of their land value to zero. The Baggetts' whole case was that Mr.
Baggett's formulated estimates were in excess of the subject property's land value and
therefore their land value should be zero.
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Many courts have struggled with developing a proper procedure for reducing a
taxpayer's land value based upon contamination. None of the reasons for significantly
reducing land values for contamination are present in the Baggetts' case. The Baggetts
are not required to pay for any of the costs to remediate their land, no institutional
controls will be placed upon the property and they may do anything they desire with the
property (no restrictions on selling). Other Courts have found that deducting costs to
remediate contamination dollar for dollar from the property's value may overstate the
value lost. Mr. Baggetts' construction cost estimates did not take into account that many
portions of his land would not need to be remediated (land under home, land under
cement, land under sod). Similarly, the Tax Commission did not take into account or
place a value on any of the Baggetts' land that was being used for its intended purposes
and would not have to be remediated.
The Nebraska Supreme Court upheld a lower court's decision that deemed an
appraiser's opinion of value not credible because he didn't have any training, education
or experience in valuing contaminated property. The taxpayer in Schmidt v. Utah State
Tax Comm 'n, County Board of Equalization, Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 48, 980 P.2d
690 (Utah 1999), at the Tax Commission level, submitted an appraisal into evidence that
was based upon the estimates to remediate the property of contamination. Even less was
known about the Superfund Site area when the Schmidt case was decided before the Tax
Commission, but at least the taxpayer provided an appraisal coupled with remediation
estimates and not just estimates as in the Baggetts' case. The Tax Commission
erroneously determined a land value of zero based solely upon Mr. Baggett's
14

construction cost estimates without any appraisal evidence. The Tax Commission
erroneously accepted Mr. Baggett's estimates as a zero value appraisal.
The Tax Commission erred in determining that based upon Schmidt because Mr.
Baggett's estimates were in excess of his land value as per the Board's appraisal he was
entitled to a land value of zero. The fair market valuation of real property is decided on a
case-by-case basis, where different facts may produce different results. The courts have
been reluctant to establish a single methodology for the valuation of real property and
equally so for contaminated real property.
The Tax Commission erred in determining that the Baggetts' land value was zero
when not one scintilla of evidence indicated a sale of zero dollars. The Board's appraisal
is the best indicator of fair market value and is reflective of sales of real property in the
Superfund Site. If an appraiser were to place a land value of zero on property that may
be contaminated, then the appraiser would be creating the market and not waiting for the
market to dictate fair market value. Since there have not been any zero value land sales
in the Superfund Site, appraising contaminated real property at zero would be wrong.
Additionally, market research indicates that the presence of contamination as well as
public knowledge of the sampling/remediation by the EPA and UDEQ have not adversely
affected property values. The Board's appraisal reflected standard appraisal practice
guidelines and was performed consistent with the International Association of Assessing
Officers Standards on Contamination. Since it was conceivable that remediation of
properties located within the Superfund Site may occur within a six month period from
the lien date, consistent with the IAAO standards any valuation affect would be minimal
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(if at all). The value arrived at by the Board's appraisal is reflective of the upward trend
in sales consummated in the Baggetts' designated Neighborhood 923.
The Tax Commission erred in determining that the fair market value of the
Baggetts' property for 2002 is $244,900, which includes a land value of zero. The Utah
Constitution and the Utah statutory scheme require that the Baggetts' property be
assessed at fair market value. Since the EPA and UDEQ will pay for all of the costs
associated with any necessary remediation performed on the Baggetts' property, such
costs should not be deducted dollar for dollar from the assessed value. The Board's
appraisal was the best and only indicator of fair market value entered into evidence at the
formal hearing. The Tax Commission erred in not accepting the Board's appraisal that
was based upon legally competent evidence arriving at fair market value.
By allowing Mr. Baggett to testify as to the fair market value of his contaminated
land when he admittedly did not have any training, experience or education in the
valuation of contaminated real property tainted the whole Tax Commission proceedings.
This error by the Tax Commission lead to the erroneous determination to value the
Baggetts' land at zero, when such determination was not supported by substantial
evidence contained in the record as a whole.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TAX COMMISSION ERRED IN ACCEPTING MR. RAGGETT'S
CONSTRUCTION COST ESTIMATES AS AN OPINION OF VALUE,
BECAUSE HE WAS NOT QUALIFIED AS AN EXPERT TO OFFER AN
OPINION OF VALUE FOR THE SUBJECT CONTAMINATED PROPERTY.
The Tax Commission erred in accepting Mr. Baggett's construction cost estimates
to remediate contamination as an opinion of value, because Mr. Baggett was not qualified
as an expert to testify as to contaminated land values. The Baggetts did not offer any
appraisal evidence, specifically Mr. Baggett's cost estimates do not rise to the level of an
appraisal of fair market value for his contaminated property.
Mr. Baggett's lack of experience, training and education in appraising
contaminated residential real property was conceded at the formal hearing. R. at 85. Mr.
Baggett testified that he was not familiar with the Uniform Standards of Appraisal
Practices and that he was not familiar with the International Association of Assessing
Officers' (IAAO) guidelines for appraising contaminated properties. R. at 85. Mr.
Baggett further testified that he is not certified to conduct residential property appraisals
in the state of Utah, and that he does not have any expertise in appraising contaminated
residential property. R. at 85-86. Mr. Baggett's ownership of the subject land does not
qualify him to give any opinions as to fair market value of the property as contaminated.
The only evidence the Baggetts submitted (over the objection of the Board) was Mr.
Baggett's construction cost estimates. R. at 86, 92-94, 98-99.
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As in Utah Department of Transportation v. Jones, 69A P.2d 1031, 1036 (Utah
1984), the Utah Supreme Court stated:
[ajdmission of any type of testimony requires the laying of proper foundation to
qualify the witness to give the particular testimony sought to be elicited. No
foundation was laid or sought to be laid regarding Jones' qualifications to testify
regarding 'the highest and best use' of the subject property. Highest and best use
is a term of art in eminent domain proceedings. Testimony regarding it must come
from properly qualified experts. Jones' ownership of the land alone would not
qualify him to give such an opinion.
Id. at 1036.
As in UDOTv. Jones, Mr. Baggett offered opinion testimony regarding the value
of his contaminated residential real property without the requisite laying of proper
foundation. The evidence contained in the record before the Tax Commission did not
include any evidence that indicated Mr. Baggett was qualified to provide an opinion of
value as to contaminated residential property. The Baggetts only provided Mr. Baggett's
biased construction cost estimates to remediate his own residential property. Mr.
Baggett's biased estimates were an attempt to apportion from the construction costs to
remediate the entire Flagstaff-Davenport Superfund Site (submitted by United Remedial
Systems to the UDEQ), to his own property. R. at 282-290. Mr. Baggett's construction
cost estimates based upon United Remedial Systems' estimates does not provide an
opinion of fair market value if the construction cost estimates are merely deducted from
the assessed value (as requested at the formal hearing). The Tax Commission accepted
this flawed reasoning in allowing Mr. Baggett to provide an opinion of fair market value
as to his contaminated residential real property. The Tax Commission further concluded
that the Baggetts' land value was zero because the cost estimates presented by Mr.
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Baggett were in excess of his appraised value by the Board. The Tax Commission erred
in accepting Mr. Baggett's opinion testimony over the objection of the Board. R. at 9294, 98-99.
POINT II
THE TAX COMMISSION'S FINDINGS ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE CONTAINED IN THE RECORD
The Tax Commission not only erred as a matter of law in valuing the Baggetts'
land at zero, the Tax Commission's findings are not supported by substantial evidence.
The Tax Commission's findings of fact are reviewed under a substantial evidence
standard and will be upheld if such findings are supported by "substantial evidence when
viewed in light of the whole record before the court." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(g)
(2003); Cache County v. Property Tax Div. of Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 922 P.2d 758,767
(Utah 1996). In reviewing substantial evidence, it "is that quantum and quality of
relevant evidence which is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a
conclusion." Utah Ass 'n of Counties v. Tax Comm 'n of Utah, 895 P.2d 819, 821 (Utah
1995).
Pursuant to Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9)3 and as indicated in
Schmidt v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, County Board of Equalization, Salt Lake County,

3

"As a prerequisite to an appellant's attack on findings of fact, appellant must marshal all
the evidence in support of the findings and demonstrate that the evidence, including all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings." Robb v.
Anderton, 863 P.2d 1322, 1328 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quotations and citations omitted).
"In order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the challenger must
present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence
introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists. After
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980 P.2d 690 (Utah 1999), "a party challenging the Commission's factual findings bears
the burden of marshaling all evidence supporting the findings and showing that this
evidence is insufficient." Schmidt at 692; See also, Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax
Comm'n, 858 P.2d. 1381, 1385 (Utah 1993).
The Tax Commission made the following findings of fact: 1) Mr. Baggetts' unit
cost estimates for remediating his property based upon the construction cost estimate
provided by United Remedial Systems to the UDEQ, was in excess of the Baggetts' land
value; 2) that the adjustments made by the Board in its appraisal were erroneous, that
none of the comparables used by the Board's appraisal are contaminated and that the
statistical sales data information provided by the Board was of "little value." R. at 181183. These findings led the Tax Commission to conclude that the Baggetts had met their
burden of proof in establishing that the costs to remediate the Baggetts' property were in
excess of its fair market value. R. at 183. In concluding this, the Tax Commission
indicated that the appropriate valuation methodology for the Baggetts' property would be
to reduce the land value to $0, and that the fair market value of the Baggetts' property is
$244,900 for the 2002 tax year. R. at 183.
The evidence in support of the findings included that the Baggetts purchased the
subject property in November 1996, and at the time of their purchase the seller did not
disclose that there may have been contamination on the property. R. at 82, 89-90, 164,

constructing this magnificent array of supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out
a fatal flaw in the evidence. The gravity of this flaw must be sufficient to convince the
appellate court that the court's finding resting upon the evidence is clearly erroneous."
Moon v. Moon, 973 P.2d 431, 437 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
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179-180, 235. The Baggetts' property was first tested in 1998 or 1999. R. at 21-23. The
Baggetts' property was found to contain levels of contamination in some areas. R. at 4547. The action levels for the Flagstaff-Davenport Superfund Site were determined to be
600 parts per million for lead and 126 parts per million for arsenic. R. at 24. Sampling
done on the Baggetts' property by the UDEQ evidenced elevated levels of lead
contamination that would need to be remediated. R. at 45-46. The sampling indicated
that the Baggetts' property contained arsenic in areas, but none of the arsenic samples
were high enough to warrant remediation by the EPA and UDEQ (arsenic levels did not
rise to action level determined by the EPA and UDEQ). R. at 45-46.
The selection of Alternative 2 with modifications by the EPA and UDEQ included
excavating the lead and arsenic contamination that is at or above the actions levels. R. at
28, 36, 45-46, 277. UDEQ has reasons to believe that there may be a "pocket" of very
contaminated soil under some properties that may extend deeper than 18 inches, which
would also need to be remediated. R. at 36, 277. On average, Superfund Sites are
cleaned up within 12 years of initially being discovered. R. at 31. The Baggetts'
property is one of the 20 properties to be remediated, which most likely may begin to be
remediated in 2004. R. at 64, 210-212.4
Further findings by the Tax Commission were United Remedial Systems or URS
provided an $11.8 million dollar cost estimate to remediate the 20 residential properties
tested by the EPA and UDEQ. R. at 33, 37, 38, 282-289. Mr. Baggett indicated that he

4 At least four contaminated property sites in the subject superfund site are currently
undergoing remediation by the EPA and the State (UDEQ).
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was a civil and environmental engineer and that he was familiar with the EPA. R. at 77,
84. Mr. Baggett has worked on a superfund site in the past where he performed
construction costs to remediate contamination. R. at 78. Mr. Baggett provided a "Cost
Estimate Chart" at the formal hearing, in order to determine what it would cost to
remediate his own property. R. at 77-80, 290. Mr. Baggett took the URS estimates for
the whole Flagstaff-Davenport Superfund Site and applied them to his own property on
an allocated basis. R. at 38, 77-80. According to Mr. Baggett and based upon his cost
estimates, the portion of the $11.8 million dollars attributable to his property would be
$465,000. R. at 80. Mr. Baggett further indicated that even if the EPA and UDEQ's cost
estimates were off by 50%, the costs to remediate would still be higher than his land
value. R. at 93, 94, 282-289, 290.
The Tax Commission further made findings that the stigma deduction provided in
the Board's appraisal was erroneous. R. at 183. The evidence in support of this finding
was the $60,000 adjustment per acre for stigma was determined from the costs to
remediate contaminated properties in the Herriman and Murray, Utah areas. R. at 106108, 181. The adjustment for stigma contained in the Board's appraisal was determined
by the Tax Commission to be erroneous, but there is not substantial evidence contained in
the record to refute the adjustment. The only mention contrary to the Board's supporting
evidence was that the UDEQ's project manager for the Flagstaff-Davenport Superfund
Site was not familiar with the costs associated with the Herriman and Murray clean up.
R. at 41. Additional evidence that may be inferred to support the Tax Commission's
findings is the evidence submitted by Mr. Baggett in the form of his construction cost
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estimates to remediate his residential real property which were in excess of the appraised
value submitted by the Board for the Baggetts' land (as discussed above). R. at 38,77-80.
The Tax Commission further made findings that the Board's appraisal considered
sales of three properties all from the same immediate neighborhood of the subject
property, but that none of the comparables chosen by the Board's appraiser were
contaminated. R. at 181. The evidence supporting these findings was from initial
testimony provided by the Board's appraiser. R. at 119-120. Wherein the appraiser
indicated that two of the properties included in her appraisal had received "no further
action letters" from the EPA and when asked if comparable number 1 and 3 were clean
properties she answered "yes". R. at 119-120.
Notwithstanding the above supporting facts, the "findings are not supported by
substantial evidence." First Natl Bank of Boston v. County Bd. of Equalization, 799
P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990). There is a wealth of substantial evidence contrary to the
Tax Commission's findings. The Baggetts' test results show that four out of the six
surface samples are below the action level for lead and all of the samples for arsenic are
below the action level. Of the 19 subsurface samples, 13 samples are below the action
level for lead. R. at 43-49, 210-213. All of the samples in the front yard are below the
action level and would not need to be remediated. R. at 47. Only the sampled areas that
exceed the action level determined by the EPA and UDEQ will be remediated. R. at 47.
No remediation would be required below 12 inches since test results showed no
contamination at that level. R. at 210-212. Since the lead contamination is all that
affects the Baggetts' property there is little health risk to its inhabitants. The primary
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source of exposure to lead is through ingestion of soils. R. at 50. With institutional
controls such as education any risk exposure can be eliminated. R. at 50. There are no
restrictions on the sale of the property by the Baggetts either by EPA or UDEQ and that
the clean up by EPA and UDEQ (at the EPA and UDEQ expense) would occur even in
the event of a sale of the property. R. at 52.
The Assessor's office performed an appraisal on the Baggetts' property as of
January 1, 2002. R. at 104, 236-244. The largest adjustment to the Baggetts' property
and the comparable properties used in the appraisal was a $60,000 stigma deduction. R.
at 106. After researching the Salt Lake County market for contaminated properties to
compare to the Flagstaff-Davenport Superfund area, it was determined that the $60,000
per acre cost to remediate contamination in Herriman would be used as an equalizer for
the Flagstaff-Davenport properties. R. at 107-108. The Assessor's office applied the
$60,000 cost to remediate in Herriman as a stigma deduction for contaminated properties
located in the Flagstaff-Davenport Superfund Site. R. at 107-108. The appraiser for the
Board indicated that the full market value of the Baggetts' property without
contamination would be $404,200. R. at 80,113.
Not only did the Tax Commission err in not adopting the appraisal of the Board,
because it was the only evidence that supports a finding of fair market value, the finding
that all of the properties were "clean" was in error. The Board's appraisal contained three
properties that were all located within the Flagstaff-Davenport Superfund Site as well as
in the subject property's designated neighborhood (neighborhood 923). R. at 236-244.
Comparable sale number 2 (9744 South Quail Ridge Road) is located on the same street
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as the Baggetts' property (9682 South Quail Ridge Road). Comparable sale number 1
and comparable sale number 3 of the Board's appraisal are properties located within very
close proximity of the Baggetts5 property. R. at 236-244. All three comparables were
selected because they are sales of a similar type of residence and all are located within the
Baggetts' designated neighborhood. R. at 237.
At the formal hearing, only the Board submitted evidence as to the contamination
status of comparable sales number 1 and 3. R. at 123-125, 230. Comparable sales 1 and
3 are located within the Flagstaff-Davenport Superfund Site and were listed by the EPA
and UDEQ as properties worthy of attention. R. at 282-289. Both properties were listed
on UDEQ's construction cost estimates provided by United Remedial Systems. R. at
283. Although these properties received "no further action letters" it does not mean that
these properties are "clean" and therefore, would not exhibit some stigma in the market.
R. at 119-120. These properties may be contaminated properties that do not rise to the
levels indicated by the EPA and UDEQ necessary for remediation.
Specifically, comparable number 1 was sampled, showing contamination of lead
and arsenic. R. at 56, 230. Comparable number 1 is within the Flagstaff-Davenport
Superfund Site designated area. R. at 56. Comparable number 1 received a "no further
action" letter because the samples did not rise to the level determined by the EPA and
UDEQ necessary for remediation. R. at 283-289. This property sold in 2001 for a price
consistent with the Board's valuation of the Baggetts' property. R. at 236-244. Just the
same, the Baggetts' property will not be remediated in some areas that contain lead, as
well as all of the areas on the Baggetts' property containing arsenic will not be
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remediated. R. at 42-48. As it is erroneous to characterize the Baggetts' property as
"clean" in the areas that do not rise to the level determined by the EPA and UDEQ for
remediation, it is equally factually erroneous to indicate that comparable number 1 is
"clean" and not a valid indicator of "fair market value" in the designated FlagstaffDavenport Superfund Site. The decision by the Tax Commission to essentially dismiss
the appraisal of the Board because comparable number 1 does not rise to the action levels
to be remediated was erroneous. Final Decision ^f 11, R. at 181. Therefore, the Tax
Commission findings of fact were erroneous.
Perhaps the most compelling indication of an acceptable range in value for the
Baggetts9 property is the purchase of the subject property in 1996. The Baggetts5
purchased the subject property in 1996 for the price of $390,000, four years after
contamination in the Flagstaff-Davenport Superfund Site was made public. R. at 49, 90.
The Baggetts purchased their property a full four years after the Flagstaff-Davenport
Superfund Site was placed on the CERCLIS list. R. at 234-235. The purchase amount of
the Baggetts' property in 1996 is also consistent with comparable number 2 used in the
Board's appraisal. R. at 238. Comparable number 2 is located on the same street (Quail
Ridge Road) as the Baggetts' property and sold for $394,900 in 2001. R. at 238. Such
comparable sales evidence should not have been simply disregarded by the Tax
Commission.
Mr. Baggett testified that they obtained conventional financing on the subject
property. R. at 90-91, 235. Furthermore, Mr. Baggett indicated that the seller of his
property had an appraisal from a reliable appraiser that supported the purchase price. R.
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at 90-91. This appraisal (supporting the purchase price) was used by Mr. Baggett at the
time of his purchase in order to obtain conventional financing. R. at 90-91. Even more
compelling, the appraisal Mr. Baggett used to obtain conventional financing did not value
the subject property's land at zero. R. at 90-91. Based upon the above, the Tax
Commission's findings cannot support a substantial evidence decision when viewed in
light of the record as a whole.
POINT III
THE TAX COMMISSION'S FINDINGS OF FACT CANNOT SUPPORT A
DETERMINATION THAT THE BAGGETTS SUSTAINED THEIR
BURDEN OF PROOF IN REQUIRING A REDUCTION IN TAXABLE
VALUE BASED UPON CONTAMINATION.
Furthermore, the taxpayer has the burden of proving that it has a right to a
reduction in taxable value based on the effect of contamination on the property and to
prove the fair market value of the property as contaminated. "Courts have struggled with
the problem of determining the effect that the costs of cleaning up environmental
contamination have on property value for tax purposes." Vogelgesand v. Cecos Intern %
Inc., 619 N.E.2d 1072, 1079 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (citing Inman Assoc, Inc. v. Borough
ofCarlstadt, 549 A.2d 38 (N.J. 1988)). The Vogelgesand court rejected the methodology
of "merely deducting] the clean up costs from the initial valuation . . . . " Id. at 1079.
The taxpayer's appraisal did not indicate the effect that these costs had on the facilities'
value and the court held that the taxpayer "did not carry its burden on this issue." Id.
In Reliable Electronic Finishing Co. v. Bd. OfAssessors of Canton, 573 N.E.2d
959, 960 (Mass. 1991), the court held that "[e]ven if the taxpayer had presented
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substantial evidence showing the anticipated cost of cleaning up the site, there was no
evidence showing .. . 'how the cost to cure a present defect would affect the value of the
property to a potential buyer.' The taxpayer did not meet its burden of proof." Id. at 960.
Similarly, the Baggetts failed to carry their burden of establishing the value of the
property when they merely deducted the remediation costs (for which the EPA and
UDEQ will pay for) from the value of the property as determined by the Board's
appraisal. R. at 49, 60, 217. The Board's appraised value of $364,800 is the only
evidence of the fair market value of the property submitted into evidence. R. at 117, 236244. Essentially, the Baggetts' whole case was that United Remedial Systems performed
a construction cost to cure estimate for the EPA and UDEQ (to which the Baggetts did
not have knowledge about the underlying data hypotheses), then, Mr. Baggett
apportioned some of those costs to cure to his property. Since he provided a number in
excess of his land value, the Baggetts argued that under Schmidt v. Utah State Tax
Comm 'n, County Board of Equalization, Salt Lake County, 980 P.2d 690 (Utah 1999)
they are entitled to a zero value. Schmidt does not stand for a legal conclusion or create a
methodology that if a taxpayer can formulate enough costs to cure as an estimate (that
someone else will pay for) then the taxpayer is entitled to deduct that full amount off of
their land value as argued by the Baggetts. Such findings by the Tax Commission in the
Baggetts' case are erroneous and cannot be supported by a substantial evidence
determination.
Furthermore, Mr. Baggett's cost estimate takes into account the whole cost to
mobilize the EPA and UDEQ for remediation of 20 residential properties, when it was
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clearly indicated by the project manager for the Superfund Site that United Remedial
Systems did not provide a breakdown on a per property basis. R. at 38. The estimate
used by Mr. Baggett was for "the entire cost of mobilizing to clean up all the properties."
R. at 38. Based upon the above uncertainty, Mr. Baggett's cost estimates should not have
provided for a dollar for dollar deduction as determined by the Tax Commission.
Similarly, in Garvey Elevators v. Adams Cty. Bd. of Equal, 261 Neb. 130, 621
N.W.2d. 518 (2001), the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the Tax Equalization and
Review Commission's ("TERC") decision that did not allow for a dollar for dollar
deduction because of contamination present on the property. In affirming the TERC
decision, the Nebraska Supreme Court reasoned that:
TERC found that the appraiser's reports, which fully deducted the costs to correct
or control environmental problems from the unimpaired value, would overstate
value lost. Each of the reports showed that if the cleanup costs were deducted
directly from the value of the property, a negative property value would be
obtained. TERC concluded that such a result was not credible because the
property has value in use.
Garvey Elevators at 140-141.
Conversely, in the Baggetts' case, the Tax Commission disregarded that the land
surrounding the Baggetts' home had any value in use. Final Decision, R. at 178-185.
The Tax Commission placed a zero value on all of the Baggetts' land. Final Decision, R.
at 178-185. The Tax Commission did not take into account that the Baggetts have full
and unfettered use of the land that surrounds their home.
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More compelling still in Garvey Elevators, the taxpayer presented evidence in the
form of an appraisal report. Id at 141. The Baggetts did not submit any evidence in the
form of a competent appraisal performed by a duly licensed appraiser.
Affirming the TERC decision the Court in Garvey stated:
TERC found that Garvey's appraiser lacked training, education, and experience in
the valuation of contaminated properties and that the appraiser's opinions
regarding the impact of contamination on the actual or fair market value of the
subject property as of the assessment date were not credible. It concluded that
Garvey's appraiser was not an expert in the valuation of contaminated property
and that the appraisal reports were not credible evidence that the property had no
value. TERC concluded that since this evidence was Garvey's only evidence of
the impact of the contamination on the value of the subject property, Garvey had
not sustained its burden of proof.
Garvey Elevators at 144 (emphasis added).
Likewise, Mr. Baggett lacked training, education, and experience in the valuation
of contaminated properties, therefore the Tax Commission erred in finding that the
Baggetts sustained their burden of proof. Mr. Baggett indicated that he: 1) was not a
licensed appraiser in the state of Utah; 2) did not have a designation from the Tax
Commission; 3) was not familiar with the contamination guidelines of the International
Association of Assessment Officers; 4) had not attended any contamination training
seminars; 5) was not familiar with the Uniform Standards of Appraisal Practice
Guidelines. R. at 85-86. Without such training or expertise, Mr. Baggett should not have
been allowed to testify as to any opinion of value for the contaminated residential
property. Furthermore, Mr. Baggetts' dollar for dollar deduction of whatever
construction cost estimates he figured may be attributable to remediate his land (taken
from the costs of mobilizing the whole EPA and UDEQ for remediation of 20 properties)
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of contamination should not have been accepted as a zero value appraisal. R. at 38.
Essentially, the Tax Commission accepted Mr. Baggett's own deductions, dollar for
dollar, as a zero value appraisal, where Mr. Baggett admittedly did not have the requisite
education, training, or familiarity with appraising contaminated residential real property
at fair market value. Based upon Mr. Baggetts' own admission, if this questionable
evidence is removed from the Tax Commissions' findings, the decision would not sustain
any substantial evidence scrutiny.
In Garvey Elevators, even though the court rejected the zero value appraisal based
upon a dollar for dollar deduction, at least it was submitted by a duly licensed appraiser.
Mr. Baggett was neither a licensed appraiser at the hearing nor was he duly qualified as
an expert to value his contaminated residential real property. The issue should not be
confused that even if he was qualified to give an opinion as to his construction cost
estimate—such estimate is not an appraisal and it is not supported by sound appraisal
theory (which should be a minimum threshold requirement to provide such testimony
before the Tax Commission). In short, the Baggetts failed to carry their burden because
they failed to offer a credible opinion of fair market value.
Furthermore, Mr. Baggett did not perform a breakdown of what it would cost to
remediate the actual portions of his land sampled by the EPA and UDEQ. Instead, Mr.
Baggett only provided costs attributable to his whole acreage. Mr. Baggett's unit cost
estimates did not take into consideration that the land under his house would not need to
be remediated, that the land under his cement driveway would not need to be remediated,
the surrounding cemented curtilage would not need to be remediated, and furthermore
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that the remaining sodded area would not need to be remediated. The $60,000 stigma
deduction evidenced in the Board's appraisal rejected by the Tax Commission provides
the best reasoning in addressing the contamination on the Baggetts' property. Because
there is value in use in the Baggetts' home, there is also value in use in the underlying
land that provides the foundation for the home. There is also value in use in the land
under the cement and sodded areas that will not need to be remediated. The $60,000 per
acre is more than adequate to deal with any stigma that is affecting the remaining area of
the Baggetts' land that will need to be remediated. Valuing the Baggetts' land at zero (as
the Tax Commission did) does not take into account the value in use concept for the
underlying land and is not supported by substantial evidence contained in the record as a
whole.
The Tax Commission should have required as a minimum in the Baggetts' case,
similar evidence that was admitted at the Tax Commission level for the Schmidt case. In
Schmidt, the taxpayer submitted an appraisal into evidence that valued their property at a
negative amount. Schmidt at 691. This amount was reached by deducting the bid
submitted by Sitex Environmental Inc., to remediate the Schmidts' property. Id. The
evidence in the Schmidt case was a construction cost estimate to remediate contaminated
property, coupled with an appraisal using one of the three accepted methods of appraisal
practice. The Tax Commission ended up not accepting the Sitex bid completely, because
as the Supreme Court stated, "[t]hat evidence was not, however, very persuasive." Id at
693. In the present situation before the court, there is only one step in the two-part
process (a construction cost estimate without an appraisal) that was disregarded by the
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Tax Commission as addressed in Schmidt as not being "very persuasive." The Baggetts
have failed to meet any minimum threshold burden showing a convincing determination
of fair market value. Without more evidence produced at the Tax Commission level by
the Baggetts, the only true opinion of value recognized under Utah state law was the
appraisal submitted by the Board. The appraisal of the Board should be considered the
best indicator of fair market value of the Baggetts' property for 2002.
In summary the Tax Commissions findings of fact that the Baggetts' property as
contaminated requires a significant reduction in value are not supported by substantial
evidence. The Tax Commission's decision to reduce the value of the Baggetts' land to
zero, based upon Mr. Baggetts' unit cost estimates for remediating his property does not
sustain the Baggetts' burden of proof required in the underlying tax appeal. Consistent
with UDOTv. Jones, Mr. Baggett should not have been allowed to testify as to his
opinion of value of the contaminated property (such testimony requiring expertise) based
upon his cost estimates. If Mr. Baggett's testimony was actually reviewed for what it
was, construction cost estimates and nothing more, then the Baggetts failed to offer a
reasonable alternative to the value submitted by the Board. Because the Baggetts failed
to carry their burden of offering the Tax Commission a sound evidentiary basis for
reducing their land value to zero as required under Utah law, the Tax Commission's
decision was in error. R. at 99-102. Nelson v. Bd. of Equalization of Salt Lake County,
943 P. 2d 1354 (Utah 1997).
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POINT IV
THE TAX COMMISSION ERRED IN DETERMINING THE BAGGETTS'
LAND VALUE AT ZERO BASED UPON CONTAMINATION WHEN SALES IN
THE MARKET DICTATE OTHERWISE AND CONSTRUCTION COST
ESTIMATES ARE TO BE PAID BY THIRD PARTIES.
The Tax Commission erred in not accepting the Board's appraisal that was based
upon comparable sales located within the Flagstaff-Davenport Superfund Study area.
The Board's appraised value of $364,800 for the subject property, including the
deduction of $60,000/acre for stigma is supported by the decision of the Utah Supreme
Court in Schmidt v. Utah State Tax Comm % 1999 UT 48, 980 P.2d 690 (Utah 1999).
The Board adhered to the Schmidt decision with its appraisal of the Baggetts'
contaminated residential property. The Court in Schmidt stated that it has never
established a single, exclusive method for fixing the value of contaminated property and
it wasn't persuaded by cases in other jurisdictions that mandated a valuation
methodology. 1999 UT 48 \ 10. Schmidt reiterated that the choice of valuation
methodology used in fixing the value of a property is a question of fact and the
Commission must base its findings on the substantial evidence based on the record as a
whole. Id. 1999 UT 48 ^|6. By refusing to adopt a specific methodology and holding that
valuation is a question of fact, the Schmidt court reaffirmed Questar Pipeline Co. and
Utah Power & Light Co. which both advocate a case by case analysis.
In Questar, the Utah Supreme Court stated that factual differences among two
cases could drastically alter the application of proper appraisal techniques. Questar
Pipeline Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm 7i, 850 P.2d 1175, 1178-79 (Utah 1993). In Utah
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Power, the Utah Supreme Court found that "[t]he fact the Commission has followed a
certain procedure in the past does not commit it to do so eternally." Utah Power & Light
Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm % 590 P.2d 332, 334 (Utah 1979). The Schmidt decision
requires the Commission to make property valuation determinations on a case by case
basis and emphasizes that the facts, backed up by substantial evidence, in each case can
affect valuations, even drastically according to Questar.
The case by case nature of valuation is also reflected in the Federal District Court
for the District of Utah in Union Pac. R.R. The federal district court in Utah stated:
"[Vjaluation is an art, not a science. It is a function of judgment, not of natural law ...."
Union Pac. R.R. v. State Tax Comm 'n, 716 F.Supp. 543, 554 (D.Utah 1988). See Amoco
Rocmount Co. v. Property TaxDiv., Appeal No. 94-1159 (June 3, 2003) (citing Union
Pacific R.R. with approval).
In Boekeloo v. Bd. Of Review, 529 N.W.2d 275 (Iowa 1995), the court held that
the assessor was required to consider groundwater contamination in valuing property, but
the court was not convinced that the Boekeloo's property had no market value
particularly where they continued to use the property for its intended purpose. Id. at 278.
In addition to the value of the home, which is used by the Baggetts, the land upon which
the house sits, the driveways and walkways, as well as the landscaped yard, are being
used by the Baggetts for their intended use. The Baggetts can sell their property; there
are no restrictions on the use of the property by any governmental entity. R. at 52. The
Baggetts are not even restricted from cleaning up their own property. R. at 59. One
individual in the area performed his own clean up. R. at 59.
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Schmidt agreed with Boekeloo that a negative value would imply that the property
was uninhabitable. The fact that the Baggetts may use their property seemingly without
restriction (other than they should not eat the dirt), suggests that this court should find
value in the use of the entire property. R. at 50.
Reasons that some courts have considered valuing the property at zero included
the owner's inability to use the property, inability to use it for its "intended use," inability
to market it for sale, or unknown potential costs for a clean up, etc. None of these factors
are present in this case. Many of the reasons for zero valuation are outlined in In re
Camel City Laundry Co., All S.E.2d 402 (N.C. Ct. App 1996). In Camel City the
polluted property contained an office building and paved parking. Id. at 403. The
property's unimpaired value was determined to be $750,000. However, when the Board
of Equalization factored in the land's contamination (which didn't affect the building's
interior nor the parking lot), the value was determined to be $430,000. To arrive at this
figure, the County's appraiser factored in a 15.1% capitalization rate, which included an
additional risk factor of 4% for stigma and non-liquidity.
More importantly, the court in Camel City refused to accept the taxpayer's
assertion that the property could be valued at zero because they couldn't sell the property.
Id. at 406. Furthermore, the court agreed with the County that present and potential
future uses of the subject property dispel the notion that the property has no value for tax
purposes. Id. Instead, the court focused on the impact the contamination had on the
property: the use of the building and parking had not been thwarted (they could be rented
out); people in the building didn't face any health risk; the property could be
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satisfactorily cleaned. The court therefore saw no reason for assigning a tax value of zero
when contamination didn't prevent the present or future owners from putting the property
to its highest and best use. In this instance, the Baggetts are putting the entire property to
its highest and best use. R. at 106. Further, they have offered no appraisal evidence that
the fair market value of the land is zero.
In Garvey Elevators v. Adams Cty. Bd of Equal, 261 Neb. 130, 621 N.W.2d. 518
(2001), while affirming the Tax Equalization and Review Commission's determination
that a zero value ignores "value in use" and that fair market value may be ascertained
using standard appraisal methods, the Nebraska Supreme Court quoted the lower court's
decision stating:
There is a tendency to discount this value based on costs related to remediating or
isolating the environmental contamination. Fully deducting the costs may
overstate the decline in value, because the value in use concept would then be
ignored. Value in use suggests that a property which is still in use, or which can
be used in the near future, has a value to the owner. This would be true even if
costs to cure the environmental problems exceed the nominal, unencumbered
value. The value in use will most nearly reflect the market value of the property.
Garvey Elevators at 143.
As indicated by the Board's evidence at the formal hearing, there are no sales in
the Flagstaff-Davenport Superfund Site consummated with a land value of zero dollars.
Since there is no evidence of any zero value land sales, an appraiser's duty is not to
"create" the market but instead to wait for sales to occur in the market. R. at 153. If an
appraiser were to simply ignore value in use, thus setting all land values at zero, the
appraiser would essentially be creating the market and not interpreting the results of sales
in the market. If the market indicates that land is selling for more than zero dollars in the
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area, the value in use of such land cannot be ignored in any competent appraisal valuation
methodology and must be included showing that the property's land value is not zero.
Essentially, the Tax Commission simply ignored the concepts recognized in the
above cases, as well as Garvey Elevators when it applied a zero value to the Baggetts'
land. The Tax Commission placed a zero value on all of the surrounding land, that the
Baggetts have total unobstructed access and use. The Tax Commission found that there
was value in use to the improvement on the Baggetts' land, but no value in use to the land
underneath the improvement, or surrounding area (driveway, grass, porch etc.). The
stigma deduction applied by the Board's appraisal more than adequately addresses the
contamination issue, when given the fact that the whole .65 acre property of the Baggetts'
property will not need to be remediated of contamination. The .65 acre property is
covered by the foundation for the home, the cement driveway and grass sodded areas
surrounding the curtilage.
In summary, the Baggetts maintain the right to exclude (to the extent that others
can't trespass and they have control over their view shed on the property), to use (they
can plant trees and plants, have parties, etc.) and to transfer (regardless of the possible
temporary absence of market). Consequently, the property only suffers from a loss in
value due to stigma as calculated by the Board in its appraisal. Ignoring the concept of
value in use for the entire land is not based upon sound appraisal practices.
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A.

Sales in the Flagstaff-Davenport do not indicate that
residential real property is selling for zero dollars.

Mr. Richard Burgi, Assistant Division Director of the Assessor's office Real
Property Division and an appraiser for over twenty years, testified that there is no
evidence in the market that land within the Flagstaff-Davenport Superfund Site is selling
for zero dollars, and, in fact, sales appear to be market sales with no evidence that
location within the Superfund study area is affecting value. R. at 141-142, 147-48. Mr.
Burgi testified that the value of the property would not be at fair market value if the land
was valued at zero. R. at 148. There are also no restrictions on either the use or the sale
of the property by the Baggetts by any governmental entity. R. at 52, 154 . Mr. Burgi's
familiarity with the Herriman clean up, as well as the Midvale Superfund Site, indicated
that contamination did not appear to affect sales within those areas. R. at 147.
Mr. Burgi testified that as early as 1992 or 1993 there were public meetings with
UDEQ, which representatives of the Assessor's office attended, with the residents of the
Flagstaff-Davenport sites to advise them of the contamination. R. at 144. The FlagstaffDavenport Superfund Site was placed on the CERCLIS list in 1992 with the completion
of the EPA's preliminary assessment in October of 1992. R. at 49, 234. In reviewing the
Board's appraisal, Mr. Burgi stated, he is familiar with the International Association of
Assessing Officers (IAAO) Standards on Contamination and that the Board's appraisal is
consistent with those standards. R. at 145. The appraisal considers the effect of
contamination on value and recognizes a deduction for stigma based on lack of
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financing.5 Since all of the comparable sales used by the Board in its appraisal were
conventionally financed (as was the Baggetts' purchase in 1996) he testified that there
was no evidence that the market value of the comparable sales were affected by location
within a Superfund site area. R. at 146-148. Since the comparable sales were either not
tested or were given "no further action" letters, the Board made a $60,000 per acre
downward adjustment to the comparables for stigma (consistent with the above
standards). R. at 152-153.
Mr. Burgi also testified that EPA's Proposed Plan issued in May 2002 stated that
the clean up will occur within a six-month period. R. at 151-153. His opinion was that if
the clean up occurred between the January 1 lien date there would be no effect on value.
R. at 151-153. This view is consistent with IAAO Standard 7.3:
The period during which value is affected must be
established. This should be related to the time when expenses
are clearly incurred or definitely to be incurred. The shorter
the period, the less the probable effect on value because
disruption to the income stream is less pronounced, and
perception of the property as "clean" will occur sooner. The
period of impact can also be important because it may be
inappropriate for the assessor to take into account costs that
are incurred later than a certain date (perhaps January 1 or
some other "assessment date"). In such a case, adjustment of
value for contamination may have to wait until the next
assessment year.
R. at 389.
5 Unlike the Baggetts, the Schmidts, who are also located in the Flagstaff-Davenport
Superfund Site, were denied construction financing due to contamination. Schmidt at ^|3,
961. The Schmidts built their home in 1994. Stigma deductions based on financing may
not be relevant since Schmidt was decided by the Tax Commission and lenders are now
protected from clean up liability where the association is solely financial. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601 (20)(E) (1994).
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There are a substantial number of sales of residential properties in the subject's
neighborhood (number 923) commencing in 1990 through 2002. R. 245-247. Tom
Leech, a certified residential appraiser in the Assessor's office, with a Masters of Science
Degree in Economics, testified that the average sale prices in the subject neighborhood
show an overall positive upward trend since 1990. R. at 249. This trend is consistent
with average sale prices county-wide that show an overall upward trend. R. at 248. The
subject's neighborhood average price per square foot for 2001 was $154.00/sq. ft. and for
2002 was $126.00/sq. ft. When compared to the County's appraised value ($364,800) for
the subject (2858 sq. ft.) the price per square foot for the subject is $105.00 sq. ft.
Although, well below the neighborhood's price per square foot once the stigma deduction
is applied, this amount is in line with the average price per square foot in the
neighborhood. If the land is valued at zero, the average price per square foot is $91.36,
significantly below the average price per square foot for the neighborhood with or
without the stigma deduction. R. at 135.
Furthermore, Mr. Leech performed a sales ratio study for Neighborhood 923. R.
at 135-137. Taking into account the appraisal submitted by the Board, Mr. Leech
indicated that his sales ratio study showed that the appraisal value was well within the
range mandated by the Tax Commission for uniformity in a given area. R. at 136. The
sales ratio study showed that the level of assessment for Neighborhood 923 was 91.5%;
the Tax Commission requires the level of assessment to be at 100 percent of market value
(but lower is accepted, providing the benefit of doubt to the taxpayer). As for the
coefficient dispersion "which measures the relative uniformity of assessments in a given
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area," the Board's appraisal value is well within the acceptable range. R. at 136. Mr.
Leech testified that the Tax Commission requires the Assessor's office to be at 10% or
less for residential property and in Neighborhood 923 the coefficient dispersion is at
2.2%. R. at 136-137. The sales ratio study further supports the proposition that
residential real properties located within Neighborhood 923 (within the FlagstaffDavenport Superfund Site) are not selling for zero dollars in land value.6
In summary, there is no evidence that sales in Neighborhood 923 reflect a decline
in value due to its location within the Flagstaff-Davenport Superfund Site. There is no
evidence in the record to indicate that residential property values have declined because
of their inclusion in the Superfund Site. As previously indicated, the Baggetts offered no
evidence of the fair market value for their residential property. There is no evidence that
contaminated land, which will be cleaned up by the EPA and UDEQ (at their expense), is
selling for zero dollars. The only evidence of fair market value that was submitted for the
Tax Commission's review was the appraisal performed by the Assessor's office and
submitted into evidence by the Board. R. at 117, 236-244.
B.

The Tax Commission's decision to vaiue the Baggetts' land at
zero is not based on legally competent evidence in an attempt
to arrive at fair market value.

Article XIII § 2(1 )(a) of the Utah Constitution provides in pertinent part t h a t " . . .
all tangible property in the State that is not exempt under the laws of the United States or
under this Constitution shall be assessed at a uniform and equal rate in proportion to its
6

Although only two sales were used in the coefficient dispersion study, the result is
indicative that fair market value sales in Neighborhood 923, located within the FlagstaffDavenport Superfund Site, are not selling for zero dollars in reference to land value.
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fair market value, to be ascertained as provide by law . . ." The Utah legislature has
provided guidance by enacting Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(12)(2004), that defines "fair
market value" as "the amount at which property would change hands between a willing
buyer and willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both have
reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts." Further defining the importance of "fair
market value," the Schmidt decision indicates that the Tax Commission needs to value the
property of the taxpayer at fair market value. "In arriving at fair market value, this court
has said that the [Tax] Commission uses one of the following recognized approaches [to
value]: cost, income, and market." Schmidt at 692, see also Beaver County v. Utah State
Tax Comm % 916 P.2d 344, 347 (Utah 1996). However, Schmidt also provides that the
Tax Commission may use an alternative for valuing properties such as contaminated
properties, wherein "[t]his court has never established a proper method for fixing the
value of contaminated property," but such valuation methodology must be based upon
substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Id at 692.
The Tax Commission erred when it valued the Baggetts' land value at zero,
because the only competent unbiased opinion of fair market value submitted into
evidence was that of the Board. R. at 117, 236-244. The Board's appraisal was
performed by a residential property appraiser with an appraisal designation from the Utah
State Tax Commission. R. at 104. The appraisal was performed pursuant to the Uniform
Standards of Appraisal Practices, and it was in conjunction with the International
Association of Assessing Officers guidelines for valuing contaminated residential
property. R. at 104-105. Furthermore, as indicated at the hearing, an appraiser's job is to
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wait for the market to provide sales to review and not to try and "create" the market in an
attempt to arrive at fair market value. R. at 153. The appraisal of the Board was the only
true opinion of "fair market value" submitted into evidence at the formal hearing. R. at
117. The appraisal was performed consistent with appraiser guidelines with the ultimate
goal of arriving at true "fair market value." R. at 117, 145, 236-244. Therefore, the Tax
Commission erred in not valuing the Baggetts' property at "fair market value," based
upon the evidence in the record before the Tax Commission.
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(12), whether the Baggetts were aware of
the contamination is not relevant to the determination of fair market value in this case
because the appraiser contemplates "nothing more than a hypothetical sale to a
hypothetical willing buyer during the tax year. The sale is a statutory fiction indulged in
by appraisers to arrive at fair market value." Bd. of Equalization v. Utah State Tax
Comm % 864 P.2d 882, 888 (Utah 1993). Similarly what is "reasonable knowledge of
the relevant facts" is also hypothetical and given the public knowledge of the existence of
contamination in the CERCLIS listing sites, which provides constructive notice of the
existence of contamination to prospective buyers and sellers and other events (such as
meetings with residential property owners) noted above commencing in 1992 through the
end of 2001, it is reasonable for the assessor to conclude that "hypothetical willing
buyers" in the subject neighborhood have "reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts,"
including the existence of contaminated soils in the neighborhood and on their property.
R. at 48-49, 61-62, 144-145, 234.
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Because the United States and UDEQ will pay for the remediation of the Baggetts'
property in 2004 (according to Tom Daniels, Superfund clean up typically occurs 12
years after discovery which in this case was in 1992) there should not be a deduction for
the costs to remediate as proposed by the Baggetts. R. at 31, 49, 217. In Sweepster, Inc.
v. Scio Tp.9 571 N.W.2d 553 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) the court held that the
indemnification agreement between Chrysler and Sweepster, which indemnified
Sweepster for environmental contamination remediation costs, and for which Chrysler
was currently paying, should be considered in the assessment. "[IJntangible valueinfluencing factors are properly taken into account when determining the true cash value
of property (citing Meadowlanes Ltd. Dividend Housing Ass fn v. Holland, 473 N.W.2d
636 (Mich. 1991)). The court stated:
The indemnification agreement unquestionably affects the
value of the subject property because it relieves petitioner and
its successors of the financial consequences of the
contamination. Petitioner cannot reasonably contend that the
indemnification agreement has no value when it has already
benefited from it considerably by having bottled water
delivered, having a study performed to determine the type of
contamination, and having a new well drilled along with a
pumphouse and pipe installed - all at not cost to itself. The
indemnification agreement in the instant case is comparable
to an environmental subsidy that affects the value of the
subject property, just as the tax subsidies at issue in
Meadowlanes, supra at 495-496, 473 N.W.2d 636, affected
the value of that property. Consequently, we find that the Tax

7 Currently, clean up is occurring at the Flagstaff-Davenport Superfund Site by the EPA
and UDEQ.
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Tribunal properly took the indemnification agreement into
consideration when determining the value of petitioner's
property.
Sweepster at 501-02, (emphasis added).
The court found that no deduction from the value of the property should be made
in light of the indemnification agreement. Because of the potential costs of litigation to
enforce the indemnification agreement, the court upheld a 10% stigma reduction.
In the instant case, the United States EPA and the State UDEQ will pay for all
costs of remediation and has paid for all testing and sampling of the Baggetts' property.
R. at 49, 60, 217. The Baggetts will incur no cost to clean up their property. R. at 49, 60,
217. Therefore, no deduction from the value of the property should be made consistent
with the Assessor's policy of not deducting for remediation costs when those costs will
be paid by a third-party. The $60,000 stigma reduction contained in the Board's
appraisal adequately addresses any negative market condition that may or may not exist,
any other deduction would be erroneous.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the Board respectfully prays that the court reverse the
Tax Commission's decision placing a zero value on the Baggetts' land for the 2002 tax
year. Additionally, the Board prays that the court order the Tax Commission to enter a
finding that the fair market value of the Baggetts' property for the 2002 tax year is
$364,800 as evidenced by the Board's appraisal submitted during the formal hearing on
June 2, 2003.
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BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION
) FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
) OF LAW, AND FINAL DECISION

DANIEL BAGGETT,
Petitioner,
v.
BOARD OF EQUALIZATION OF
SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH,

) Appeal No
) Parcel No.

03-0336
2812151008

) Tax Type:

Property Tax/Locally Assessed

) Tax Year:

2002

) Judge:

Phan

Respondent.

Presiding:
Jane Phan, Administrative Law Judge
Appearances:
For Petitioner:
For Respondent:

Max Miller, Attorney at Law
Mary Ellen Sloan, Tax and Revenue Unit Chief, Salt Lake County Attorney's
Office
Thomas Peters, Salt Lake County Deputy Attorney
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission for a Formal Hearing on June 2,
2003. Based upon the evidence and testimony presented at the hearing, the Tax Commission hereby makes
its:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Petitioner is appealing the market value of the subject property as set by Respondent

for property tax purposes.
2.

The year in question is 2002, with the lien date at issue January 1, 2002.

3.

The subject property is parcel number 28-12-151-008. It is located at 9682 South

Quail Ridge Road, Sandy, Utah.
4.

The Salt Lake County Assessor initially valued the subject property at $364,900 as of

P0
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the lien date in question. Of this amount the Assessor had allocated $103,700 to the value of the land and
$261,200 to the value of the building.
5.

The Salt Lake County Board of Equalization reduced the value to $288,500. Of this

amount the Board allocated $43,600 to the land and $244,900 to the building.
6.

The subject property consists of a .65 acre lot with a rambler style residence. The

residence was 19 years old. It had been constructed of good quality and was in good condition on the lien date.
The residence has 2,858 above grade square feet with a 2210 square foot basement, 1989 square feet of which
are finished.
7.

The subject property is located within an environmentally contaminated area

designated as a Superfund Site by the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") and is currently on the
National Priorities List. It was proposed that the site be placed on the National Priorities List in December
2000. As so designated, the EPA intends to pay for the remediation of the property without contribution from
the property owners. It appears that the environmental remediation of the subject property will eventually
occur, but there are funding issues, which are as yet unresolved with the federal government. The source of the
contamination was the Davenport Smelter that was operated for a few years in the late 1800's. In addition, a
second smelter, the Flagstaff Smelter, operated nearby around the same time period. It was not discovered
until 1992 that there might be an environmental problem in the area of the old smelters, after residences had
been built in the area. Some soil testing was completed by the Utah Department of Environmental Quality in
the area and it was determined that there was significant lead and arsenic levels. None of these early tests were
completed on the subject property. The UDEQ continued to study the site, determine the impact on health and
work to obtain funding for remediation.
8.

Petitioners purchased the subject property in 1996. At that time of the purchase they

did not know that there was an environmental problem on the subject property as no disclosure concerning
-2-
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possible contamination had been made by the seller. They purchased the property with conventional financing.
Petitioners testified that after they learned of the problem in 1998, they attempted to discover if the seller knew
about the contamination for purposes of determining whether to file a lawsuit against the seller for
nondisclosure. It was Petitioners' conclusion from their investigation that the subject property had not been
tested for environmental contamination prior to their purchase and that there had been no official notice from
the EPA or UDEQ to the prior owners about contamination. The subject property was not tested until 1998
and the test indicated lead in unsafe levels at some locations on the subject property. It was UDEQ's
determination that the lead contamination was sufficient to require remediation and the subject property was
included with other properties in the Superfimd site.
9.

UDEQ went through the process of estimating the cost of clean up to the twenty

properties involved, including the subject, and eventually issued a Proposed Plan for public comment in May
2002. A decision was made as to the extent of the clean up and a Record of Decision was issued in February
2003. The UDEQ estimated the clean up of the twenty properties would cost $11.8 million dollars. In its
estimate, UDEQ indicated excavation and removal of 12 inches of topsoil from the entire subject property
except for the area covered by house, garage and driveway. The contaminated topsoil then would have to be
shipped to a special landfill and the property replaced with clean soil and landscaping. The UDEQ bid was
prepared in the normal course of business and relied on to begin the remediation process and for purposes of
obtaining funding.

Tom Daniels, Environmental Engineer, UDEQ, and Project Manager for the

Davenport/Flagstaff Superfund Sites, testified that UDEQ was beginning some extensive soil testing to
determine if there were certain sections of the various properties where the levels of contaminates were low
enough that the soil would not have to be removed. After these tests UDEQ could determine if the actual costs
for the clean up could be lowered below the estimate. Although Mr. Daniels indicated that it was possible that
areas of the subject property would not need any remediation, he testified that it was clear that portions of the
-3-
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subject property were sufficiently contaminated to require remediation.
10.

The UDEQ did not separate its cost estimate to the portion of the $ 11.9 million that

would be applicable to the subject property. The estimate was for all twenty properties in the Superflind site.
Petitioner Daniel Baggett, who had some expertise in performing construction cost estimates, determined that
of the total $11.9 million UDEQ estimate, $472,470 would be the amount relating specifically to the subject
property. It was Petitioner's position that the land value for the subject property be reduced to $0, based on the
fact that the environmental cleanup would cost more than the value of land.
11.

Respondent submitted an appraisal at the hearing prepared by Kathy Taufer, State

Certified Appraiser and employee of Salt Lake County. It was Ms. Taufer's appraisal conclusion that the value
of the subject property was $364,800. This is substantially higher than the value set by the County Board of
Equalization. However, she argued that the County Board of Equalization had reached its value conclusion
based on an error she had made at that time. In the appraisal Ms. Taufer considered sales of three properties all
from the same immediate neighborhood of the subject property. However, none of the comparables chosen by
Ms. Taufer were contaminated.
12.

The adjustment that Ms. Taufer made for the fact that the subject property was

contaminated while the comparables were clean ranged from $22,200 to $28,800 per comparable. The amount
of the adjustment was based on $60,000 per acre, a number that she determined from the cost to remediate
contaminated properties in Herriman and Murray, Utah. She considered the Herriman properties to be similar
to the Davenport site. It was also her testimony that sales in Herriman had remained consistent before and
after the contamination was found and remediated.
13.

The Respondent also submitted at the hearing statistical information concerning

residential sales in the area the county designated as the neighborhood of the subject property.

It was

Respondent's conclusion that the contamination and superflind designation had not adversely affect the market
-4-
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value of the properties in the neighborhood. However, this statistical information is of little value in this
matter, as the neighborhood designated by Respondent encompasses a larger area than the twenty properties
determined to be contaminated by UDEQ. In addition, like Petitioners when they purchased the subject
property, other purchasers may not have been aware of the environmental problem at the time of the purchase.
Mr. Richard Burgi, Appraisal Supervisor for Salt Lake County, testified that from their experience with the
Herriman Superfund Site and a Midvale Superfund Site, it was the County's opinion that any impact on real
estate values would be short term as the values would improve as a result of the clean up.
14.

Respondent also presented hearsay information that one property owner in the

Superfund area had been able to clean up his own property for a cost in the $20,000 range. However, this
information was unreliable as the witness who testified concerning the amount was not sure of its accuracy.
15.

From weighing the information presented in this matter the Commission concludes

that the subject property is contaminated with unsafe levels of lead and the governmental entities responsible
for making the decision have determined that the remediation of this property is necessary. It is likely that this
property will eventually be remediated by the UDEQ and EPA at no expense to the property owner, but until
that time the value of the subject property is significantly impacted. The best evidence of the cost of cleanup of
the Superfund Site is the estimate prepared by UDEQ. This is a matter under the expertise of UDEQ and the
estimate was prepared in the usual course of UDEQ's function to facilitate remediation and obtain the
appropriate funding. Petitioner has made a reasonable determination that $472,470 of the UDEQ's estimate
pertains to the subject property. The evidence clearly supports Petitioners' contention that the cost to
remediate the subject property is greater than the value of $103,700 placed on the land of the subject property
by the County Assessor's Office.

The adjustment made by Ms. Taufer in the appraisal submitted by

Respondent does not take into consideration the cost to remediate the subject property. The adjustment is
based on purported costs of the UDEQ and EPA to remediate other properties. The Commission gives
-5-
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deference to the UDEQ in this matter as it has the expertise to make the determination as to the costs.
Obviously the UDEQ has made a determination that the costs to remediate the site in which the subject
property is located is much higher than the costs at the other sites to which the County has referred.
16.

The Commission determines that the appropriate valuation methodology for this

property would be to reduce the land value to $0. This methodology was relied on by the Commission and
sustained by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Schmidt v Utah State Tax Comm'n, County Board of
Equalization, Salt Lake County, 980 P.2d 690 (1999). The evidence in this matter indicates that the cost to
remediate the subject property is higher than the land value and may be higher than the combined value of the
land and improvements. The Commission finds the adjustment made by Respondent for the environmental
problems of the subject property is erroneous. Although the property had been placed on the Superfund
National Priorities List as of the lien date, a proposed plan had not as yet been issued by the UDEQ. A
prospective purchaser on the lien date, if they purchased the property at all, would do so at a significant
reduction that is not adequately reflected in the County's appraisal. However, as in Schmidt there is still a
value in use as Petitioners resided at the subject property and used it for its intended function without
significant limitations. Based on this methodology the Commission finds that the fair market value of the
subject property as of the lien date at issue is $244,900.
APPLICABLE LAW
1.

The Tax Commission is required to oversee the just administration of property taxes to

ensure that property is valued for tax purposes according to fair market value. Utah Code Ann. §59-1 -210(7).
2.

To prevail, the Petitioner must (1) demonstrate that the County Board of

Equalization's assessment contained error, and (2) provide the Commission with a sound evidentiary basis for
reducing the original valuation to the amount proposed by Petitioner. Nelson V. Bd. Of Equalization of Salt
Lake County, 943 P.2d 1354 (Utah 1997).
-6r> *
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
In this matter the Respondent is entitled to a presumption of correctness as to only the value
set by the County Board of Equalization. Respondent, did not request that the Board of Equalization's value
be sustained, nor did it present evidence to support the Board of Equalization's value. It requested a higher
value and has an equal burden of proof to support the higher value as Petitioner has to support the lower value.
In this matter Petitioner has better met its burden of proof.
DECISION AND ORDER
Based upon the foregoing, the Tax Commission finds that the market value of the subject
property as of January 1,2002, is $244,900. The County Auditor is ordered to adjust the assessment records as
appropriate in compliance with this order.
DATED this < z ^ L _ day of

,2003.

\J^PLX^

Si
JafnePhan
Administrative Law Judge
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BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION:
The Commission has reviewed this case and the undersigned concur in this decision.

Notice of Appeal Rights: You have twenty (20) days after the date of this order to file a Request for
Reconsideration with the Tax Commission Appeals Unit pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-13. A Request
for Reconsideration must allege newly discovered evidence or a mistake of law or fact. If you do not file a
Request for Reconsideration with the Commission, this order constitutes final agency action. You have thirty
(30) days after the date of this order to pursue judicial review of this order in accordance with Utah Code Ann.
§§59-1-601 and 63-46b-13 et. seq.
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